This paper presents and investigates a new data set of individual residential property transactions in England. The main novelty of the data is the record of all listing price changes and all offers ever made on a property since it appears on the market, as well as all the visits by potential buyers for a subset of the sample. We analyze individual seller and potential buyers behavior within property transaction histories. This leads us to establish a number of stylized facts pertaining specifically to the timing and terms of agreement in housing transactions, and more generally, to the sequence of events that occur from initial listing to sale agreement. * We thank Halifax Estate Agencies for giving us access to their transaction records. The patient research assistance of Christos Tsakonas and Fernando Goni was very much appreciated.
Introduction
The sale of a house is a classic example of a situation that entails strategic interactions between a seller and a set of potential buyers. When a house is put on the market, the seller posts a listing price and waits for potential buyers to make offers. When a match between the seller and a potential buyer occurs, bargaining takes place, leading possibly to a sale agreement. At any point in time while a house is still on the market, the seller has the option of revising the listing price.
To date, the lack of adequate data has severely limited the scope of empirical research on housing transactions. Existing data sets typically include property characteristics, time to sale, initial listing price, and sale price. They do not contain information on the buyer's side of the transaction (e.g., the timing and terms of offers made by potential buyers), or on the seller's behavior between the listing and the sale of a property. Data limitations have also constrained the development of theoretical research on the strategic interaction between buyers and sellers in the housing market, due to a scarcity of stylized facts theoretical models ought to confront. This paper presents and investigates a new data set of individual residential property transactions in England. The main features of our data are the record of all listing price changes and all offers ever made on a property since initial listing. In addition, for a subset of transactions in our sample, we have a complete record of viewings. That is, we observe the sequence of all visits by potential buyers. We are therefore in a unique position to analyze the behavior of buyers and sellers within individual property histories.
Our analysis generates a number of stylized facts pertaining specifically to the timing and terms of agreement in housing transactions, and more generally, to the entire sequence of events that occur from initial listing to sale agreement.
The picture of the house buying process which emerges from the data can be summarized as follows. The listing price influences the arrival rate of viewings which in turn affects the arrival of offers, which ultimately determines the timing of the sale. As time on the market increases, the arrival rate of viewings decreases and the probability of a listing price revision increases, especially if no offers have been received. Furthermore, the longer the time on the market, the lower the level of offers relative to the listing price and the higher the probability a seller accepts a first offer. Finally, the longer the time on the market, the lower the sale price relative to the listing price.
A high initial listing price results in fewer viewings, higher offers and a higher sale price but a longer time on the market. Listing price decreases concern primarily properties which have not received any offer while being on the market for a substantial period of time (in fact, a period equal to the average time to sale). Proportionally, decreases in listing price are greater than the average percentage difference between the sale price and the initial listing price. A third of all matches are unsuccessful; the large majority of sellers who turn down the first bidder end up selling at a higher price. These are a few of the salient features observed in the data. A full summary is proposed in Section 5.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follow. After a brief review of the literature in Section 2, Section 3 explains the construction of the data set and provides institutional details. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 discuss the insights gained from the information on listing price changes and offers. The sellers response to offers is analyzed in Section 4.3. For the relevant subset of the sample, we report in Section 4.4 information on the viewings and revisit our findings incorporating this supplementary data into the analysis.
Relevant literature
A vast empirical literature focuses on the estimation of hedonic equations to predict the sale price of a house as a function of its characteristics. By design, this approach ignores the strategic interaction between buyers and sellers by implicitly assuming that the housing market is perfectly competitive. Therefore, it has no predictive power relative to the listing price, the offer distribution, and the time to sale. Partial attempts to address these issues include Horowitz (1992) , and Genesove and Mayer (1997) .
Horowitz estimates a structural model of the seller's behavior which generates predictions for the sale price and the time to sale of a house, conditional on its characteristics and its listing price. Besides overcoming some of the limitations of the hedonic price regressions, his approach also considerably improves upon the accuracy of price predictions.
The drawback of Horowitz's framework, however, is that it abstracts from modeling the behavior of the potential buyers. As a consequence, his analysis is incapable of fitting the offer distribution and generates a poor prediction of the time it takes to sell a property. Genesove and Mayer (1997) build a data set for the Boston condominium market where they are able to uncover the financial position of each seller. They find that sellers with high long-to-value ratio tend to set a higher initial listing price, have a lower probability of sale but, if and when they sell, obtain a higher price.
These two studies points to the listing price as a significant determinant of the sale price and the timing of the transaction. Similar evidence is reported in Springer (1996) , Knight et al. (1998), and Glower et al. (1998) . Typically in the existing literature, the choice of listing price is assumed to result from the seller's optimization in face of a tradeoff between expected time to sale and sale price: a low listing price increases the arrival rate of potential buyers but precludes the possibility of sales at a high price (e.g. Yavas (1992) , Yavas and Yuang (1995) , Haurin (1988) and Arnold (1999) ). Rosenthal (1996a, 1996b) provide a theoretical foundation for this view of the listing price. They argue the listing price is a commitment device for the seller who provides incentives for potential buyers to incur search costs in order to learn their own willingness to pay for the property. They model the seller's problem as stationary, hence there is no scope for any listing price change.
The theoretical work of Coles (1998) on stock-flow matching provides a model with predictions concerning the optimal listing price strategy over time. A new seller first faces the existing stock of potential buyers who have not found anything to their liking on the market. Hence she does not face any competition from the current stock of sellers who have had their property on the market for a while. If they had a property to the liking of any potential buyer, they would have sold it. In this context, a Dutch auction allows the new seller to extract the best price from any existing potential buyer who has a high enough value of her property. If none of them buy the property, the seller remains on the market and compete with the existing stock of sellers to attract any incoming potential buyers. Coles show that it is then optimal for the seller to continuously decrease her listing price as time goes by.
The optimal listing price behavior depends critically on the information it carries and how buyers internalize this information; i.e., what happens once a seller and a buyer are matched. Prior to our study, no data was available to inform the theory on the bargaining element of the transactions, an element overlooked so far. Existing models either give all the bargaining power to one of the parties or assumes Nash bargaining.
Our data provides the missing information and opens new avenues for further theoretical contributions.
The Data
In England, most residential properties are marketed under sole agency agreement. This means that a property is listed with a single real estate agency that coordinates all market related activities concerning that property from the time it is listed until it either sells or is withdrawn.
Agencies represent the seller only. Listing a property with an agency entails publishing a sheet of property characteristics and a listing price. The listing price may be revised at any time at the discretion of the seller. Potential buyers search by visiting local real estate agents and viewing properties. A match between the seller and a potential buyer occurs when the potential buyer makes an offer. Within a match, the general practice is for the seller to either accept or reject offers. In the event the seller rejects an offer, the potential buyer either makes another offer or walks away. If agreement occurs, both parties engage the administrative procedure leading to the exchange of contracts and the completion of the transaction. This procedure typically lasts three to eight weeks.
During this period, among other things, the buyer applies for mortgage and has the property surveyed. Each party may cancel the sale agreement up to the exchange of contracts.
For each property it represents, the agency keeps a file containing a detailed description of the property, its listing price, and a record of listing price changes, offers, and terms of the sale agreement, as required by law. The information contained in each individual file is also recorded on the accounting register that is used by each agency to report to the head office. Although all visits of a property by potential buyers are arranged by the listing agency, recording viewings is not required either by the head office or by law. However, individual agencies may require their agents to collect this information for internal management purposes.
Our data set was obtained from the records of four real estate agencies in England.
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Three of these agencies operate in the Greater London metropolitan area, one in South Yorkshire. Our sample consists of 780 complete transaction histories of properties listed and sold between June 1995 and April 1998 under sole agency agreement, for which the records in the accounting register and in the individual files are consistent. Each observation contains the property's characteristics as shown on the information sheet published by the agency at the time of initial listing, the listing price and the date of the listing. If any listing price change occurs, we observe its date and the new price. Each match is described by the date of the first offer by a potential buyer and the sequence of buyer's offers within the match. When a match is successful, we observe the sale agreed price and the date of agreement which terminate the history. In addition, for the properties listed with one of our Greater London agencies (which account for about a fourth of the observations in our sample), we observe the complete history of viewings. Since events are typically recorded by agents within the week of their occurrence, we use the week as our unit of time.
Our data spans two geographic areas with different local economic conditions and two different phases of the cycle in the housing market. While the local economy in Greater London has been experiencing a prolonged period of sustained growth, this has not been the case in South Yorkshire. Furthermore, from June 1995 to April 1998, the housing market in the Greater London metropolitan area went from a slow recovery to a boom.
While this transition occurred gradually, for ease of exposition we refer to 1995-96 as the recovery and to 1997-98 as the boom. Table 1 contains an overview of some of the features of our data. Column 1 refers to the properties in our sample located in South Yorkshire. Columns 2 and 3 refer to properties in Greater London that were listed during the recovery and the boom, respectively. Column 4 refers to the overall sample. Before turning our attention to the analysis of the data, a few remarks are in order.
First, the emphasis of this paper is on the events leading to the sale of a property and on the behavior of buyers and sellers during this process. For this reason, we restrict attention to the analysis of transaction histories for which we have a complete record of all events from initial listing to sale agreement. For example, some properties may be listed with more than one agency. Under a multiple agency agreement, the information recorded by one agency does not necessarily account for all the events in a transaction history. For instance, different potential buyers may submit their offers on the same property through different agencies and the sale agreement is recorded only in the agency 2 These characteristics are only a subset of the ones listed in the information sheet published by the agency at the time of initial listing. The additional variables were excluded from our analysis since they appear to have no effect on prices.
3 Agents typically list the major appliances to be left with the property. The number of such appliances was the only information recorded in the data set. Second, the cancellation of a sale agreement is not a rare phenomenon. In our sample, 1 out of 5 agreements is cancelled. Agents' records indicate that cancellations are usually due to the arrival of new information such as a bad survey or failure to obtain mortgage. A sale agreement may also be contingent upon the successful completion of other transactions (e.g., the purchase of a house by the seller). Hence, cancellations may also be induced by the failure of related transactions. Here we implicitly assume that parties bargain in earnest. That is, we assume that this feature of the English housing market does not distort the behavior of the parties involved in a housing transaction and that the object of a negotiation is the sale of a house.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we use our data to analyze the details of the process leading to the sale of a property, from its initial listing to a sale agreement. The first step in this process is the To investigate the effects of local market conditions on transaction histories, throughout our analysis we use agency-specific dummy variables, labeled AGENCY1, AGENCY2, AGENCY3, and AGENCY4, where AGENCYi is equal to 1 if the property is located in the local market where agency i operates and 0 otherwise (i = 1, 2, 3, 4). Note that agencies 1, 2, and 3 list properties located in different communities within the Greater London metropolitan area, while agency 4 operates in South Yorkshire. Furthermore, to account for aggregate dynamics in the English housing market, we specify a linear trend for the month in our sampling period when each property was listed, MONTH, and an additional linear trend for the properties located in Greater London, MONTHGL.
Listing price
What determines the initial listing price of a property? To what extent is this price related to the property's observable characteristics? We begin our analysis by investigating the relation between individual property characteristics and initial listing price using the standard hedonic framework. The results of a regression of the initial listing price (ILISTP) on the property characteristics, agency dummies, and the trend variables MONTH and MONTHGL are reported in Table 3 . Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Note that the default property is a one bedroom semi-detached house located in South Yorkshire (i.e., the local market where agency 4 operates).
All of the parameter estimates associated with the property characteristics included in the hedonic regression are statistically significant at conventional levels and have the The variables included in our regression jointly account for 80 percent of the observed variability in the initial listing price. This level of explanatory power is comparable to what is typically found in the literature on hedonic models of housing prices.
7 Overall, the choice of initial listing prices by sellers depends to a large extent on the observable characteristics of their properties. Our specification of the hedonic model, however, cannot fully account for the variability in initial listing prices.
The first novelty of our data set is the information on listing price changes, which is summarized in Table 4 below. 8 As we can see from this table, about a fourth of all sellers change their listing price at least once. 9 Before a first price change, they wait 11 weeks on average. Recall from Table 1 above that the average time to sale is also 11 weeks. This observation suggests that sellers who change their listing price wait a significant amount of time before doing that. The price drop is also substantial. It is equal to 5.3 percent on average, which is greater than the average sale price discount relative to initial listing price (4.1 percent). In the vast majority of cases, sellers who decrease their listing price have no prior response from prospective buyers: in 86 percent of the cases, price changes occur before an offer was ever received.
Looking at differences across local markets, columns 1-3 in Table 4 illustrate that in more active markets and in booming markets price changes are less frequent and, when they occur, they entail a smaller reduction of the listing price.
What prompts sellers to revise their listing price? When do they revise it? Does it have anything to do with whether or not they receive an offer? To explore these issues further, we estimate a flexible functional form hazard (Flinn and Heckman, 1982) for the probability a seller would revise the listing price in any given week after putting 6 Given the size of its estimated coefficient, the variable APPL must be capturing more than the monetary value of what it accounts for.
7 Recent work which incorporates variables accounting for the details of all local public amenities generates higher values for the regression's R 2 . These details are not available in our data. 8 The overwhelming majority of price changes were price decreases. Of the three cases of listing price increases, one is minor, less than one percent. The other two are more substantial: one is an adjustment within a few days of initial listing, the other occurs three months after initial listing, reflecting possibly home improvements.
9 Note that only 9 transactions involved 3 listing price changes, the maximum observed in our sample. his property on the market. 10 The flexible functional form for the hazard function we consider here is given by:
where t denotes weeks since initial listing, ELIST P t the effective listing price at time t, X 2 the vector of time-invariant covariates, and X 1,t the vector of time-varying covariates. 11 In particular, the set of time-invariant variables we consider includes property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, and the initial listing price. Our specification also includes a time-varying variable denoting the highest offer received each week as a proportion of the effective listing price (HOELISTP). HOELISTP is set to zero when no offer was received and thus captures both whether or not an offer was received and the relative level of this offer.
As reported on Table 5 , all terms of the cubic specification of the baseline hazard are significant displaying the following non-monotonic pattern: the probability of a price revision increases first up to 15 weeks, it then decreases until week 47 before rising again.
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Receiving a high offer decreases the probability of a price change. A high initial listing 10 This approach consists of approximating the baseline hazard function with a polynomial function in time, where the order of the polynomial function is chosen to best fit the data.
11 Since not all sellers revise their listing price, some observations are censored. We correct for censoring in the estimation which is carried out by maximum likelihood.
12 Likelihood ratio tests reject higher-order polynomial specifications in favor of the cubic specification reported here. Table 6 .
As we can see from this table, the longer sellers wait to change the listing price, the larger the drop. Also, the higher the initial listing price, the smaller the listing price revision in percentage terms. The lack of offers does not seem to have any effect on the magnitude of listing price changes.
Matches and Offers
The second novelty of our data set concerns the record of all matches that occur between each seller in our sample and the potential buyers who choose to make offers on his
property. This information is summarized in Table 7 below. Approximately 72 percent of all transactions occur within the first match. Only 10 percent of all sales occur after 3 or more matches.
13 About a third of all matches are not successful. On average, the success rate of first matches is higher than that of later matches. About three quarters of the sellers are matched with a potential buyer within ten weeks of putting their property on the market. More than ten percent within one week.
Looking at differences across local markets, columns 1-3 in Table 7 illustrate that more active markets and booming markets are characterized by greater turnover. Matches occur sooner, they are more frequent, and their success rate is lower. Figure 1 plots the average number of matches per week for all properties still on the market. This measure of the rate of arrival of matches increases from the first to the 13 Note that only 10 transactions occur after 5 or more matches and the maximum number of matches in the sample is 7. What affects the rate of arrival of matches? How do time on the market and listing price influence the probability of a match occurring? To address these questions we estimate a flexible functional form hazard (similar to the one above) for the probability a match would occur in any given week since the listing of a property on the market.
The set of time-invariant variables we consider includes property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, and MONTHGL. Our specification also includes two time-varying variables denoting the effective listing price (ELISTP) and the occurrence of listing price changes (DPC), respectively.
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The maximum likelihood estimates and standard errors we obtain are reported in Table 8 below.
As we can see from Table 8 , all terms of the quadratic specification of the baseline hazard are significant displaying the following non-monotonic pattern: the probability 14 DPC is a time-varying indicator variable that takes the value 0 prior to a listing price change and 1 from the occurrence of a listing price change on. of arrival of the first match decreases first up to 23 weeks since initial listing and then increases. 15 A listing price revision increases the probability of arrival of the first match, but the level of the listing price has no effect on this probability. Also, more active markets are associated with a higher probability of arrival of the first match.
When a match occurs, the seller and the potential buyer engage in a bilateral bargaining process characterized by a sequence of buyer's offers that the seller either accepts or rejects. Our data set contains detailed information on all offers ever made on a property, which is summarized in Tables 9, 10, and 11 below. Table 9 summarizes the main properties of observed sequences of offers within matches.
Potential buyers make up to four consecutive offers, increasing their offers at a decreasing rate. In more than half of the matches only one offer is exchanged. Almost 40 percent of sales occur at the first offer ever received, 54 percent occur at the first offer of a match.
Upon rejection of their first offer, 68 percent of all potential buyers make a second offer.
The remaining 32 percent walk away, leading to a match breakdown or separation. The incidence of separations increases with the number of rejected offers. That is, the fraction of potential buyers who terminate a negotiation after having their first offer rejected is smaller than the fraction of potential buyers who do so after a second or third rejection.
In Table 10 , we restrict attention to offer sequences within a match that are not censored by agreement with the seller. That is, we restrict attention to unsuccessful matches or matches that terminate with a separation. As we can see from this table, the higher the number of offers in a match the lower the first offer relative to the listing price. In general, the higher the number of offers in a match, the higher the last offer relative to the effective listing price. It therefore appears that the more offers there are in a match, the broader the interval spanned by the offers. As we can see from columns 1-3 in Tables 9 and 10 , in more active markets we observe a larger volume of offers and offers that are on average closer to the listing price. Within offer sequences, however, we observe smaller increments.
In Table 11 , we compare the first offer in a match across different matches within a transaction history. As we can see form this table, on average, the first offer relative to the listing price is increasing in the number of matches in a transaction history. In particular, both in the aggregate as well as in each local market, the first offer in the first match is on average farther away from the listing price than the first offer in successive matches within the same transaction history.
What affects the level of the first offer by a potential buyer which initiates a match? Do offers depend systematically on such factors as how long a property has been on the market and whether the seller previously engaged in negotiations that were unsuccessful?
To answer these questions we regress the first offer in a match as a fraction of the effective listing price at the time of the match (PERMFOEL) on the property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the number of weeks between initial listing Table 12 below.
As we can see from Table 12 , ceteris paribus, the level of the first offer in a match relative to the listing price is lower the longer a property has been on the market and if it is the first offer ever made on a property. Also, after controlling for property characteristics, time on the market, and order of matches, potential buyers in more active housing markets initiate matches with offers that are closer to the effective listing price.
Once an offer is on the table and a seller is matched with a potential buyer, what determines the seller's decision as to whether to accept or reject the first offer in a match?
Is this decision influenced in a systematic way by how long the property has been on the market and whether or not the seller is facing his very first match? To address these questions we define the variable ACCEPT as a binary variable that equals one if the seller accepts the first offer in a match and zero otherwise. The results of a logit estimation where ACCEPT is the dependent variable and the set of independent variables includes property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the number of weeks between initial listing and the occurrence of the match (WTMATCH), the first offer in the match as a fraction of the effective listing price at the time of the match (PERMFOEL), and the match indicator MATCH1, are reported in Table 13 below.
As we can see from Table 13 , ceteris paribus, the probability of acceptance of the first offer in a match on the part of the seller is higher the longer a property has been on the market, the closer the offer is to the listing price, and whether it is the first offer ever received.
16 Also, after controlling for property characteristics, time on the market, and order of matches, sellers in more active housing markets are less likely to accept a given offer relative to listing price.
In the event their offer is rejected by the seller, potential buyers have to decide whether to make a second offer or terminate a match by walking away. We investigate the buyer's decision using a logit model with the same specification as the one we use to analyze the seller's acceptance decision. The results of our analysis, not reported here, indicate no systematic effects except for the fact that, ceteris paribus, the probability a potential buyer walks away after having his first offer rejected is lower in the first match than in successive matches.
The analysis of the level of successive offers within a match, the seller's acceptance decision, and the behavior of potential buyers' after a rejection, produces similar results to the ones reported above for the initial offer in a match. The details are therefore omitted.
We can now ask the following question: What differentiates successful matches form unsuccessful ones? In other words, are there observable factors that systematically influence the behavior of potential buyers and sellers when they bargain over a property and affect the relative probability that a match would result in a sale agreement instead of a separation? To address this question we define the variable SUCCESS as a binary variable that equals one if bargaining within a match leads to a sale agreement and zero if it terminates with a separation. The results of a logit estimation where SUCCESS is the dependent variable and the set of independent variables includes property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the number of weeks between initial listing and the occurrence of the match (WTMATCH), the maximum offer in the match as a fraction of the effective listing price at the time of the match (MAXOELP), the number of offers exchanged in the match (MNOFFER) and the match indicator MATCH1, are reported in Table 14 below.
As we can see from Table 14 , ceteris paribus, the probability a match is successful is higher the longer a property has been on the market, the higher the maximum offer in the match relative to the listing price, the larger the number of offers that are exchanged in the match, and whether it is the first match. Also, holding everything else constant, in more active housing markets the probability of success of a match is lower. 
Sale agreement
The timing and terms of the sale agreement for the properties in our sample are summarized in Table 15 below. In the table, the effective listing price denotes the listing price at the time of the sale agreement. As we can see from Table 15 , in a booming housing market sale prices are on average closer to the effective listing prices, a larger fraction of sales occur at the listing price, and properties sell considerably faster. Overall, properties in our sample sell at about 96% of their effective listing price and 13 percent of the properties sell at the listing price.
The mean and median time to sale are 11 and 7 weeks, respectively. Figure 2 plots the sale price of each property relative to its effective listing price as a function of the number of weeks since initial listing. About 11 percent of all properties took more than 26 weeks to sell and are omitted from the graph. A few relatively inexpensive properties (listed for less than £20,000) sell at a very large discount, up to 50 percent. In the vast majority of cases the sale price is below the listing price. A few transactions take place at a sale price above the listing price. These instances are due either to rounding up or to simultaneous bidding by competing buyers. The "luckiest" seller at this game had a listing price of £99,950. He turned down an offer at £85,000 two weeks after initial listing. A few days later, 4 buyers started bidding against each others, pushing the price up to £125,000. Overall, the figure suggests that the longer a property is on the market, the lower its sale price relative to its listing price. 
Weeks since listing Percent of initial listing price
Recall from Table 7 above, that about three quarters of all sale agreements occur within the first match. In Table 16 , we summarize information relative to sale agreements that follow an unsuccessful first match. As we can see from this table, in 13 percent of the cases properties sell at a price below the maximum offer in the first match, 20 percent sell for the same amount, and the remaining two thirds of the properties sell at a price above (see also Figure 3 ). On average, after an unsuccessful first match, sellers wait 6 weeks before reaching a sale agreement and realize a 4 percent gain relative to the best offer in the first match.
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What accounts for the timing and terms of a sale agreement? To investigate these issues we perform two empirical exercises. The first exercise consists of estimating a flexible functional form hazard for the probability a sale would occur in any given week since the listing of a property on the market. The set of time-invariant variables we consider includes property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, and MONTHGL.
Our specification also includes three time-varying variables denoting the effective listing price in each week (ELISTP), the number of offers received each week, and the highest offer received each week as a proportion of the effective listing price (HOELISTP).
18 .
Maximum likelihood estimates and standard errors are reported in Table 17 below.
As we can see from Table 17 , the only estimated parameter that is significant is the one associated with the variable HOELISP. Conditional on at least one offer being made on a property in any given week, the larger the best offer relative to the listing price, the higher the probability of a sale agreement. In particular, none of the terms in our quadratic specification in time is significantly different from zero. Weeks since first match Percent of best offer first match the size of offers, the probability of a sale occurring in any given week is constant over time. These findings point to the rather obvious conclusion that the main determinant of whether a property sells in a given week is whether or not an offer is received and how high this offer is relative to the listing price.
The second empirical exercise we perform consists of regressing the sale price (SALEP) on the property characteristics, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the initial listing price (ILISTP), the number of matches since initial listing (NMATCH), and the number of weeks from initial listing to sale agreement (WTSALE). The results are contained in Table 18 .
As we can see from Table 18 the higher the initial listing price the higher the sale price. An active housing market and a booming market are also associated with higher sale prices. The shorter the time on the market and the higher the number of matches, the lower the sale price. Overall, the regression accounts for 99 percent of the variability in sale prices.
Viewings
For a sub-sample of 199 properties located in the local market within the Greater London metropolitan area where one of our agencies operates, our data set contains complete viewing records. A viewing is recorded each time a potential buyer visits a property.
Information on viewings is summarized in Table 4 .4 below.
On average, there are 9.5 viewings per transaction. Only 9 properties sell after one viewing. The median number of viewings is 7, the maximum is 51. The distribution of viewings is depicted in Figure 3 . The average number of viewings per week on the market is 1.7. As illustrated in Figure 4 , the arrival rate of viewings over time displays a monotonic decreasing pattern that is similar to the one observed for the arrival rate of matches.
Given the observable characteristics of a property, is the rate of arrival of viewers affected by the listing price? To answer this question we propose a Poisson regression of the viewings rate, measured by the number of viewings per week on the market, on the property characteristics, the effective listing price (ELISTP), and time on the market (TSALE). 20 The results are reported in Table 20 below.
As shown in Table 20 , holding the characteristics of a property constant, a high listing price has a negative effect on the arrival rate of viewings. Also, time on the market and viewings rate are negatively correlated.
With the additional information on viewings available, we can now revisit some of the issues we addressed earlier and assess the role played by viewings in the process leading to the sale of a property. In particular, we ask whether viewings affect the sellers' decisions to revise their listing price, the arrival of matches, or the timing of sale agreements. To address these issues, for each week a property is on the market we define two variables that measure the number of viewings in the week (NVIEW) and the cumulative number of viewings from initial listing (CUMVIEW), respectively. We include these two additional explanatory variables in our econometric analysis of the time to first price change, the time to first match, and the time to sale, respectively. The outcomes of these exercises can be summarized as follows. First, the occurrence (or the lack) of viewings appears to have no effect either on the probability of observing a price change or on the probability of a sale agreement. 21 Second, the more viewings in a week and the greater the total 20 The regression results remain the same if the effective listing price is replaced by the initial listing price. 21 The maximum likelihood estimates of flexible functional form hazards for these probabilities which include the additional variables on viewings are not reported here. They are available from the authors upon request. number of viewings since initial listing, the higher the probability of receiving an offer that week. This is the main finding that emerges from the maximum likelihood estimates of a flexible functional form hazard for the probability a match would occur in any given week since the listing of a property on the market that are contained in Table 21 below.
Another interesting result that emerges from these estimates when compared with the ones reported in Table 8 above, is that after controlling for the arrival of viewings, a listing price revision no longer has any effect on the probability of arrival of the first match. 
Summary and concluding remarks
This paper considers a new data set of housing transactions in England. The main novelty of the data is the record of all listing price changes, all offers and even viewings for a subset of the sample. The data enables us to supplement anecdotal with statistical evidence, hence providing a more accurate picture of the process by which residential properties are transacted.
A high listing price, conditional on characteristics, is correlated with a low rate of viewings. The viewings rate gradually decreases with time on the market. The data does not show a discrete drop in the arrival rate of viewings after a week or two, once the stock of potential buyers would have had a chance to visit a newly listed property.
This finding stands in contrast to the traditional stock-flow view of the market; i.e., one whereby people who have not found anything they like, when first searching for a property, hang around waiting for new listings. There does not seem to be a stock of potential buyers waiting for new properties to be listed and going to view them upon listing. If there is, this stock is minimal relative to the regular flow of new potential buyers arriving on the local market in any given week.
Listing price reductions are large (5 percent), and fairly infrequent. They are larger than the average difference between sale price and initial listing price (4 percent). First price changes occur on average after 11 weeks, a period equal to the average time to sell.
They concern approximately 20 percent of the properties. Although the listing price appears to be one of the main determinants of the arrival rate of viewings, not receiving any offer seems to be the main factor leading to a listing price reduction.
Only one in seven viewings yields an offer. More than half the potential buyers do not make more than one offer, some because it is accepted. Of the potential buyers whose first offer is turned down, 32 percent walk away. In 13 percent of the transactions, a sale was agreed following a first offer made within 1 percent of the listing price.
Almost 40 percent of the properties sell at the first offer ever received and 70 percent to the first person to make an offer. Although this means there is a significant amount of separation without agreement, the majority of people who engage in bargaining do reach agreement on a sale price.
Of the sellers who reject all the offers of their first potential buyer, only 4 percent end up selling below the best offer of their first potential buyer. On average, they sell at 4 percent above the best offer of their first potential buyer after a 6 week wait.
The longer a property remains on the market, the lower the probability a seller rejects a first offer. Buyers seems to understand this relationship: the longer a property has been on the market, the lower the first offers relative to listing price. As a result, it is not surprising that a long time to sale is correlated with a low the sale price relative to listing price.
To the eyes of an economist, and in light of existing theories of housing transactions, a puzzling feature that emerges from our data is the limited extent to which sellers and buyers experiment. First, most sellers do not revise their listing price, and no seller adjusts their listing price gradually over time. Second, few viewings turn into an offer. When they do, they often lead to a sale. Third, during the bargaining process most buyers make a small number of offers. A large fraction of them only make one offer, sometime at the listing price. This evidence seems surprising in light of the fact that listing price changes and offers are fairly costless activities. Furthermore, the conventional wisdom about housing transactions is that they entail a great deal of uncertainty about the buyers' and sellers' valuations of properties.
In an attempt to further improve our understanding of this market, forthcoming research will propose a game theoretic model capable of reproducing the main features of the data. Estimating this model should provide an appreciation for the degree of inefficiencies in the current market arrangement and test alternatives. Further data exploration should shed light on the impact of differences in the economic environment (a booming versus a dull market) and the determinant of withdrawals for the properties which did not reach sale agreement.
